In this paper we present the extraproximal method for computing the Stackelberg/Nash equilibria in a class of ergodic controlled finite Markov chains games. We exemplify the original game formulation in terms of coupled nonlinear programming problems implementing the Lagrange principle. In addition, Tikhonov's regularization method is employed to ensure the convergence of the cost-functions to a Stackelberg/Nash equilibrium point. Then, we transform the problem into a system of equations in the proximal format. We present a two-step iterated procedure for solving the extraproximal method: (a) the first step (the extra-proximal step) consists of a "prediction" which calculates the preliminary position approximation to the equilibrium point, and (b) the second step is designed to find a "basic adjustment" of the previous prediction. The procedure is called the "extraproximal method" because of the use of an extrapolation. Each equation in this system is an optimization problem for which the necessary and efficient condition for a minimum is solved using a quadratic programming method. This solution approach provides a drastically quicker rate of convergence to the equilibrium point. We present the analysis of the convergence as well the rate of convergence of the method, which is one of the main results of this paper. Additionally, the extraproximal method is developed in terms of Markov chains for Stackelberg games. Our goal is to analyze completely a three-player Stackelberg game consisting of a leader and two followers. We provide all the details needed to implement the extraproximal method in an efficient and numerically stable way. For instance, a numerical technique is presented for computing the first step parameter (λ) of the extraproximal method. The usefulness of the approach is successfully demonstrated by a numerical example related to a pricing oligopoly model for airlines companies.
Introduction
The extraproximal approach (Antipin, 2005) can be considered a natural extension of the proximal and gradient optimization methods used for solving the more difficult problems of finding an equilibrium point in game theory. The simplest and most natural approach to implement the proximal method is to use a simple iteration by omitting the prediction step. However, as shown by Antipin (2005) , this approach fails. A more versatile procedure would be to perform an "ex-game (von Stackelberg, 1934) , a leader and two followers, for a class of ergodic controllable finite Markov chains (Poznyak et al., 2000) using the extraproximal method (Antipin, 2005) . The leader commits first to a strategy x in the Markov chains game. Then, the followers realize a Nash solution (Clempner and Poznyak, 2011) obtaining ϕ l (·, ·|x) (l = 1, 2) as the cost functions. The optimal actions x of the leader are then chosen to minimize its payoff ϕ 0 (·, ·|x). The main concern about Stackelberg games is as follows: the highest leader payoff is obtained when the followers always reply in the best possible way for the leader (this payoff is at least as high as any Nash payoff). For ground-breaking works in the Stackelberg game, see those by Bos (1986; 1991) , Harris and Wiens (1980) , Merril and Schneider (1966) or von Stackelberg (1934) . Surveys can be found in the works of Breitmoser (2012), De Fraja and Delbono (1990) , Nett (1993) or Vickers and Yarrow. (1998) .
In this paper we present the extraproximal method for computing the Stackelberg/Nash equilibria in a class of ergodic controlled finite Markov chains games. We exemplify the original game formulation in terms of coupled nonlinear programming problems implementing the Lagrange principle.
In addition, Tikhonov's regularization method is employed to ensure the convergence of the cost-functions to a Stackelberg/Nash equilibrium point. The Tikhonov regularization is one of the most popular approaches to solve discrete ill-posed problems represented in the form of a non-obligatory strict convex function. Then, we transform the problem to a system of equations in the proximal format.
We present a two-step iterated procedure for solving the extraproximal method: (a) the first step (the extra-proximal step) consists of a "prediction" which calculates the preliminary position approximation to the equilibrium point, and (b) the second step is designed to find a "basic adjustment" of the previous prediction. Each equation in this system is an optimization problem for which the necessary condition for a minimum is solved using a quadratic programming method, instead of the iterating projectional gradient method given by Moya and Poznyak (2009) . Iterating these steps, we obtain a new quick procedure which leads to a simple and logically justified computational realization: at each iteration of both sub-steps of the procedure, the functional of the game decreases and finally converges to a Stackelberg/Nash equilibrium point (Trejo et al., 2015) .
We present the analysis of the convergence as well the rate of convergence of the method. Additionally, the extraproximal method is developed in terms of Markov chains for Stackelberg games consisting of a leader and two followers. We provide all the details needed to implement the extraproximal method in an efficient and numerically stable way. For instance, a numerical method is presented for computing the first step parameter (λ) of the extraproximal method. The usefulness of the method is successfully demonstrated by a numerical example related to a pricing oligopoly model for airlines companies that choose to offer limited airline seats for specific routes.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the preliminaries needed to understand the rest of the paper. The formulation of the problem for the N -player game and the general format iterative version of the extraproximal method is presented in Section 2. A three-player Stackelberg game for a class of ergodic controllable finite Markov chains using the extraproximal method is given in Section 4. Section 5 includes the analysis of the converge of the extraproximal method and proves the convergence rates, which is one of the main results of this paper. A numerical example related to a pricing oligopoly model for airline companies validates the proposed extraproximal method in Section 6. Final comments are outlined in Section 7.
Controllable Markov chains
A controllable Markov chain (Clempner and Poznyak, 2014; Poznyak et al., 2000) is a quadruple M C = {S, A, Υ, Π}, where S is a finite set of states, S ⊂ N, endowed with discrete topology; A is the set of actions, which is a metric space. For each s ∈ S, A(s) ⊂ A is the non-empty set of admissible actions at state s ∈ S. Without loss of generality we may take A= ∪ s∈S A(s); Υ = {(s, a)|s ∈ S, a ∈ A(s)} is the set of admissible state-action pairs, which is a measurable subset of S × A; Π (k) = π (i,j|k) is a stationary transition controlled matrix, where
representing the probability associated with the transition from state
The dynamics of the game for Markov chains are described as follows. The game consists of (N +1) players (denoted by l = 0, N ) and begins at the initial state s l (0) which (as well as the states further realized by the process) is assumed to be completely measurable. Each player l is allowed to randomize, with distribution d l (k|i) (n), over the pure action choices a
The leader corresponds to l = 0 and followers to l = 1, N . At each fixed strategy of the leader d 0 (k|i) (n), the followers make the strategy selection trying to realize a Nash equilibrium. Below we will consider only stationary strategies d
Consider a non-zero sum game with a leader whose strategies are denoted by x ∈ X and N followers with strategies
the joint strategy of the followers. The leader is assumed to anticipate the reactions of the followers. They are trying to reach one of the Nash equilibria for any fixed strategy x of the leader, that is, to find a joint strategy w * = w 1 * , . . . , w N * ∈ W satisfying for any admissible
x ∈ X, w l ∈ W l and any l = 1, N the system of inequalities (the Nash condition)
where wl is a strategy of the rest of the followers adjoint to v l , namely,
Here ϕ l (v l , wl|x) is the cost-function of the player l, which plays the strategy v l ∈ V l , and the rest of the players-the strategy wl ∈ Wl. Lemma 1. The Nash equilibriumw ∈ W for the followers given a fixed strategy of the leader x ∈ X (8) can be equivalently expressed in the joint format (Tanaka and Yokoyama, 1991) ,
Proof.
Summing (8) for any fixed v ∈ V and any x ∈ X. Let f (x, w) (x ∈ X, w ∈ W ) be the cost function of the leader. The functions of the followers ϕ l (v l , wl|x) l = 1, N and the function of the leader f (x, w) are assumed to be convex in all their arguments.
Definition 1. A strategy x
* ∈ X of the leader together with the collection w * ∈ W of the followers is said to be a Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium if
3.2.
Regularized Lagrange principle application. Applying the Lagrange principle (see, for example, Poznyak et al., 2000) for Definition 1, we may conclude that (10) can be rewritten as
The approximative solution obtained by the Tikhonov regularization (see Poznyak et al., 2000) is given by
where δ > 0 and
Notice that with δ > 0 the functions considered become strictly convex providing the uniqueness of the discussed conditional optimization problem (12). For δ = 0 we have (11). Notice also that the Lagrange function in (12) satisfies the saddle-point condition (Poznyak, 2009) , namely, for all x ∈ X and λ ≥ 0 we have
3.3. Proximal format. In the proximal format (see Antipin, 2005 ) the relation (12) can be expressed as
where the solutions x * δ , v * δ , w * δ and λ * δ depend on the small parameters δ, γ > 0.
Define the extended variables
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and the functions
. In these variables the relation (15) can be represented in a "short format" as
. (16) 3.4. Extraproximal method. The extraproximal method for the conditional optimization problems (12) was suggested by Antipin (2005) . We design the method for the static Stackelberg-Nash game in a general format.
The general format iterative version (n = 0, 1, . . . ) of the extraproximal method with some fixed admissible initial values (x 0 ∈ X, v 0 ∈ V , w 0 ∈ W , and λ 0 ≥ 0) is as follows:
1. The first half-step (prediction):
or, in the extended variables,
2. The second (basic) half-step,
or, in the "short format",
Remark 1. The direct one-step procedure, when λ n+1 = λ n , does not work (see the counter-example of Antipin (2005)).
Markov format for the extraproximal method
We consider a three-player Stackelberg game l = 1, N . Player l should be understood to refer to players in a general expression of the game. In the remainder of this paper, the leader is designated as player (0) and the followers as players (1) and (2). Numbers are used to refer to players in a specific expression. We also assume that the number of strategies and actions that this description can take is finite and fixed. Here we will apply the iterative quadratic method providing a significantly quicker rate of convergence.
4.1.
Cost functions and notation. The individual cost-functions of the followers and the leader are defined as follows.
Cost-function for the leader:
(i1,k1;i2,k2;i0,k0) c
Cost-functions for the followers:
Follower 1:
Follower 2:
For n = 0, 1, . . . , let us define the vectors
Let us introduce for simplicity the following notation:
For the leader we have
From
as well as
|c
For computing the Nash equilibrium point, we define the function g (v, w, x) as follows:
4.2. Tikhonov's regularization method. The regularized problem for (24) is defined as follows:
and for (27) we have
4.3. Lagrange principle. Let us apply the Lagrange principle (Poznyak, 2009 ) with the Lagrange function
Extrapoximal method for Markov chains.
The procedure for solving the Stackelberg/Nash equilibrium point for the extraproximal method consists of the following "iterative rules" implementation.
First half-step:
1.a. For
343
we have
1.c. For
1.d. For
Second half-step:
2.a. For
2.b. For
we obtain
2.c. For
we get
2.d. For
4.5. Quadratic programming solver. Let us restrict the expression (3) for the admissible set and the stationary case with the following constraint.
represents a stationary mixed-strategy that belongs to the simplex
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A necessary and sufficient condition for d (l) (i l |k l ) to be a Stackelberg/Nash equilibrium point is the solution of the following QPP (quadratic programming problem):
subject to d
We consider the problem
where
is defined as
The vector b l is defined as
We will construct the matrix
Then, we have
. . .
Developing the formulas of (31) for N players and multiplying by c (l) (i l |k l ) for each component (31), we have
is defined as follows:
where 
Convergence analysis
on Z with fixed x, then f (z) satisfies the inequality
Proof. By the necessary condition for a minimum at z * ,
and the convexity property of f (z), expressed as Each company knows how the increased offer lowers airline seats price and their profits. Strategic dependence is a common practice in the global airline industry. In this case, AA does this so it can predict the strategic pricing movements of other airlines. By anticipating the predicted response of the followers, AA is able to make a strategy to become and stay successful. Given δ = 14.3, γ = Remark 2. Price efficiency and effectiveness are critical for an airline's ability to compete and survive. However, this does not mean that every airline should seek to offer the lowest price. Instead, it is important to offer the appropriate price for routes not considered by the leader airline. 
Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper was the development of the extraproximal method for computing the Stackelberg/Nash equilibria in a class of ergodic controlled finite Markov chains games. The nonlinear programming problem was represented using an implementation of the Lagrange principle. Another important contribution was the use of the regularizing parameter, which provides strong convexity for the cost-functions and, hence, the correctness of the convergence analysis.
For solving the extraproximal method, we presented a two-step iterated procedure which involved an iterative solution of a quadratic programming problem for the solution of the Stackelberg game in terms of Markov chains. A numerical method was presented for computing the first step of the extraproximal method (parameter λ). The convergence of the suggested procedure to the Stackelberg/Nash equilibrium was also analyzed. It is important to note that we provided all the details needed to implement the extraproximal method in an efficient and numerically stable way for ergodic controlled finite Markov chains games.
